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HIGH COURT CHANGES POSITION ON STANDARD OF CARE OF LEARNER 
DRIVERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the High Court decision of  Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376, a person who voluntarily undertakes to 
instruct a learner driver of a motor vehicle is owed a lower standard of care than that owed to other road users.  
The standard of care was still expressed to be objective; however, it took into account the inexperience of the 
learner driver.  Therefore, a person instructing a learner driver was owed a duty of care the standard being that 
of a reasonable learner driver. This ‘special relationship’ was said to exist because of the passenger’s knowledge 
of the driver’s inexperience and lack of skill. On 28 August 2008 the High Court handed down its decision in 
Imbree v McNeilly [2008] HCA 40, overruling Cook v Cook. 
LOWER COURTS 
The appeal to the High Court came from the New South Wales Court of Appeal where in McNeilly v Imbree 
(2007) 47 MVR 536; Aust Torts Reports ¶81-895 a majority (Beazley and Basten JJA) held that the driver 
(McNeilly), being 16 years old and unlicensed, was liable to the injured passenger (Imbree) who allowed him to 
drive the four-wheel drive vehicle.  All members of the court took into account the inexperience of the driver, 
but the majority found that he had breached the lower standard.  
The accident occurred during a four-wheel drive trip taken by Imbree, his two sons, another adult and 
McNeilly, a friend of one of the sons. Imbree knew that McNeilly did not have a learner’s permit but was aware 
that he had driven a four-wheel drive vehicle owned by his grandparents.  During the trip Imbree allowed his 
son and McNeilly to take turns driving when he considered the road conditions to be safe, instructing them not 
to exceed 80 kilometres per hour.  At the time of the accident, Imbree was sitting in the front passenger seat.  
McNeilly, travelling at approximately 80 kilometres per hour, swerved around an object on the gravel road, but 
went too far left causing the wheels to go onto the shoulder of the road which consisted of loose sand, gravel 
and dust. Instead of steering back onto the road, he accelerated and turned too far right causing the vehicle to 
cross the road. McNeilly then attempted to right the vehicle but oversteered again resulting in the vehicle rolling 
onto its roof.  
In the lower courts, McNeilly argued that the acceleration and the oversteering were a product of inexperience. 
In the Court of Appeal, Basten JA agreed that the evidence of McNeilly’s panic upon swerving to the right of 
the road was ‘the kind of response which was reasonably to be expected from a driver with that level of 
experience, as known to the plaintiff’: McNeilly v Imbree at [79]. However, the evidence was that McNeilly had 
demonstrated on the road trip that he could exercise basic driving skills on gravel roads and that the need to 
avoid an object on the road – an object that the high-set vehicle could have travelled over without problem – fell 
‘within the field of basic driving skills; but it was executed carelessly’: McNeilly v Imbree at [83]. 
 The Court of Appeal was divided on how to assess the apportionment in respect of Imbree’s contributory 
negligence.  The Supreme Court had assessed it at 30%, but Basten JA in the Appeal Court held that the 
contributory negligence was two-thirds, Beazley JA assessed it as a half, and Tobias JA, who had held there was 
no breach, considered that if there was contributory negligence, her agreed with Basten JA. 
Imbree appealed to the High Court submitting that Cook v Cook should be overruled and the standard owed to 
him should be that of a licensed driver.  Therefore as the incorrect standard of care had been applied, the 
apportionment of responsibility was incorrect.   McNeilly cross-appealed ,arguing that the standard of care 
expressed in Cook v Cook was correct and needed to be restated in contemporary terms and that application of 
that standard meant that there was no breach of duty and the application should be dismissed. 
 A majority of six to one of the High Court overruled Cook.  Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ delivered a joint 
judgment with Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreeing and Kirby J gave his own separate reasons.  Only Heydon J 
declined to reconsider Cook, holding that it was not a necessary step to take in light of the fact that the 
negligence action could be supported without overruling the decision: at [185] and [186]. 
GUMMOW, HAYNE AND KIEFEL JJ 
 The court noted the circumstances in which the High Court would reconsider its earlier decisions,
1
 among them 
the need to reconsider if ‘change is necessary to maintain a better connection with more fundamental doctrines 
and principles’: at [45]. At [53]-[54], Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ stated: 
The basic considerations of principle may be stated as follows. First, the inquiry is about the applicable 
standard of care. Secondly, the standard to be applied is objective. It does not vary with the particular 
aptitude or temperament of the individual. Thirdly, it is, and must be, accepted that a learner driver 
owes all other road users a duty of care that requires the learner to meet the same standard of care as 
any other driver on the road. The learner may have to display ‘L-plates’ for all other road users to see, 
                                                          
1  See Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund (1982) 150 CLR 49 at 56-58and John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 
166 CLR 417 at 438-439 per Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 
but that learner will be held to the same standard of care as any other driver in fulfilling the learner's 
duty to take reasonable care to avoid injuring other road users. Fourthly, it was not suggested in 
argument, and there is nothing in Cook v Cook that would suggest, that a learner driver owes a lesser 
standard of care to any passenger in the vehicle except the licensed driver who sits in the adjoining seat. 
In particular, it was not suggested that any knowledge of another passenger that the driver was 
inexperienced affects the standard of care that the driver must observe to avoid injury to that other 
passenger. 
 
Knowledge of inexperience can thus provide no sufficient foundation for applying different standards 
of care in deciding whether a learner driver is liable to one passenger rather than another, or in deciding 
whether that learner driver is liable to a person outside the car rather than one who was seated in the 
car, in the adjoining seat. The other passenger will ordinarily know that the driver is a learner driver; 
the road user outside the car can see the L-plates. Yet it is not disputed that the learner driver owes each 
of those persons a standard of care determined by reference to the reasonable driver 
 
It was observed that in Cook and in the case before the court, the injured plaintiff was described as the 
‘instructor’ or ‘supervisor’ of the inexperienced driver: at [59]. Whichever term is used, the legislation in the 
different Australian jurisdictions requires, as a minimum, that the learner be accompanied by a licensed driver 
and that person supervise their driving.  It was questioned why a learner driver could exercise less reasonable 
care to avoid damage to their supervisor than any other passenger or road user: at [67].  Also, any amount of 
supervision or instruction is restricted in what it may achieve.  Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ noted:  
 
…it must be recognised that there are limits to what supervision or instruction can achieve. There are 
limits because no amount of supervision or instruction can alter two facts. First, unless the vehicle has 
been specially modified to permit dual control, it is the learner driver, not the supervisor or instructor, 
who operates the vehicle. Second, the skill that is applied in operating the vehicle depends entirely 
upon the aptitude and experience of the learner driver: at [66].  
 
Their Honours were also influenced by the fact that in applying Cook, the same act of negligence resulting in 
the same kind of damage could require different standards of care depending upon which injured party was the 
supervisor of the learner driver: [70].  However, if the injured party was a supervisor, the issue of contributory 
negligence may be of importance.  At [72] it was held: 
 
The principle adopted in Cook v Cook departed from fundamental principle and achieved no useful 
result. It is necessary, of course, to recognise that it is a decision that has stood for more than 20 years. 
Although it seems that there are few if any decided cases in which it has been applied to deny liability, 
it must be assumed that its application may have affected the terms on which cases have been 
compromised and the apportionments of responsibility that have been made by courts and parties. Yet 
despite these considerations, it is better that the departure from principle is now recognised. The 
plaintiff who was supervising the learner driver, the plaintiff who was another passenger in the vehicle, 
the plaintiff who was another road user are all entitled to expect that the learner driver will take 
reasonable care in operating the vehicle. The care that the learner should take is that of the reasonable 
driver. 
 
 Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ thought it necessary to discuss the decision of Insurance Commissioner v 
Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39 as that case also considered knowledge on the part of the injured plaintiff of the 
driver’s inability to achieve a reasonable standard of care in driving, but in relation to drink driving rather than 
inexperience. In Joyce, Latham CJ held that no duty of care was owed as ‘[i]n the case of the drunken driver, all 
standards of care are ignored [because the] drunken driver cannot even be expected to act sensibly’: at 46, cited 
in Imbree v McNeilly at [82].  Their Honours compared this inability to drive with the decision of Cook (at [83]) 
stating that ‘deficiencies of the defendant does not so readily lead to a conclusion of the kind reached in Cook v 
Cook’.  Linked to knowledge of inability to exercise the objective standard of care is the defence of volenti non 
fit injuria. This defence requires not only knowledge of the defendant’s inability to achieve the standard of care 
imposed by law, but also the plaintiff agreeing with full knowledge to accept the risk.
2
  Without full acceptance 
of the risk, mere knowledge of the defendant’s inability to exercise reasonable care will only amount to 
contributory negligence.  At [86] it was stated: 
                                                          
2
  Yarmouth v France (1887) 19 QBD 647 at 657 per Lord Esher MR; Osborne v London and North Western Railway 
Co (1888) 21 QBD 220 at 223 and 224 per Wills J; Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway Co [1926] AC 725 at 731 per 
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline. 
 Standing alone, however, a plaintiff's actual knowledge of good reasons to think that the defendant may 
not meet the standard of the reasonable person provides no sufficient or certain basis for concluding 
that some lesser yet objective standard of care should be applied. 
 
 As to the apportionment of responsibility for Imbree’s contributory negligence, their Honours agreed that the 
Court of Appeal’s apportionment needed to be set aside as it was comparing the culpability of the parties 
according to the lower standard of a learner driver.  Therefore the initial assessment of the trial judge, 30%, was 
reinstated. 
KIRBY J 
Kirby J stated that he agreed with much that was written in the joint judgment: at [106]. However, his Honour 
thought that the issue of the standard of care of a learner driver had to be considered in the context of the 
compulsory schemes of third party insurance that exist in all Australian jurisdictions. At [108] he stated: 
[Compulsory insurance] is clearly an aspect of the social reality in which the common law principle 
falls to be expounded in this case. Its existence encourages my acceptance of a single universal, 
objective standard of care owed by all drivers. Giving weight to the consideration of compulsory 
insurance accords with a growing preparedness of the courts to acknowledge the influence of 
insurance, at least where it is compulsory and provided by statute, in defining the content of legal 
liability. I would not therefore ignore this consideration.  
 
Kirby J held that it was the existence of compulsory motor vehicle third party insurance that obliged the court 
to overrule Cook and impose a uniform and objective standard of care: 
 
If such compulsory insurance were not part of the legal background to the expression of the applicable 
common law, and if it were the case, or even possible, that someone in the position of the driver (or the 
owner) of the vehicle would, or might, be personally liable for the consequences of that person's 
driving affecting a passenger (such as the appellant) or other third party it is extremely unlikely, in my 
view, that the courts would impose on them liability, as in the case of the appellant's claim, sounding in 
millions of dollars. Such a course would be unrealistic and futile, characteristics the courts usually 
endeavour to avoid: at [111]. 
 
After 60 years of compulsory third party insurance, Kirby J was of the opinion that the ‘fiction of individual 
personal liability’ should be adjusted to acknowledge reality: at [112]. His Honour referred to many cases, 
Australian and other jurisdictions, that considered the issue of insurance, acknowledging that the issue was 
controversial and had been avoided by counsel, but the as a judge of the court, the controversial issue had to be 
considered: at [137]. For example, in the English case of Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 707, Lord Denning 
MR and Megaw LJ disagreed with Dixon J’s approach in Joyce that the standard of care is determined by the 
circumstances in which the plaintiff accepts as a passenger.
3
  Lord Denning MR referred to the impact of 
compulsory third party insurance (at 699-70) and Megaw LJ listed the practical considerations that arose should 
the relationship of the driver and passenger determine the standard of care (at 707-9).  Kirby J agreed with their 
Lordships decision but noted that the theoretical and practical considerations listed by Megaw LJ did not by 
themselves warrant the overruling of Cook, but the added ingredient of compulsory third party motor vehicle 
insurance did.  At [143] his Honour stated: 
 
the principle in Cook tends to defeat the large social purposes that lay behind the enactment of 
compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance in the case of motor vehicle negligence legislation. In 
the result, the principles in Cook do not stand as a rule of the common law of Australia. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of Imbree v McNeilly brings the standard of care owed by a learner driver into line with the 
objective standard imposed upon all defendants in negligence actions.  Although the standard of care may take 
into account certain characteristics of the defendant, for example if they are a child
4
 or a skilled professional,
5
 
the decision of Cook v Cook required a variable standard the depended upon the relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant – a relationship based upon the plaintiff’s knowledge of the defendant’s inexperience and 
lack of skill.  As noted by Gleeson CJ at [3], knowledge of certain attributes of a defendant is relevant to the 
defences of contributory negligence and volenti non fit injuria.   
                                                          
3  (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 59. 
4  McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199. 
5  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
Under the law of Cook, a contributorily negligent plaintiff not only had to prove breach of a lower standard of 
care but also have their culpability compared to that lower standard of care when apportionment was considered 
by the court.  This decision does away with that imbalance.  However, although the court referred to the reality 
of the limited control a passenger may have, it was pointed out that a professional instructor with dual controls 
will have greater control to take reasonable care of their own safety should contributory negligence be raised. 
All drivers at some time were learners and inexperienced.  Experience is gained through practise – usually in 
the family car with a licensed member of the family (as acknowledged by the court at [2]).  Imbree v McNeilly 
now ensures that such a passenger, even if regarded as a supervisor or instructor of the learner, will not be 
treated differently by the law.  As it will be the third party insurance companies exposed to liability from this 
change in standard, no doubt arguments of contributory negligence will become standard and no doubt the rarely 
successful defence of volenti will be argued. 
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